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Abstract
Part I of this Article examines whether, in evaluating a concentration, the Commission of the
European Communities is permitted to take into account factors, such as industrial or social policy,
that are not, strictly speaking, related to competition law. Part II explores whether “dominant position” has the same meaning under the Regulation No. 4064/89 as under Article 86 of the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community and, in particular, whether the Regulation also
applies to concentrations that create, or further narrow, interdependent oligopolies. Part III examines whether the Commission is required to prohibit or modify every concentration that creates or
strengthens a dominant position, or whether it is required to do so only when a further evaluation
indicates that the concentration will result in effective competition being substantially impeded in
all or a substantial part of the common market. The Article concludes with some reflections on
market definitions, customer dependence and vertical concentrations.

THE EVALUATION OF CONCENTRATIONS
UNDER THE MERGER CONTROL
REGULATION: THE NATURE OF
THE BEASTt
James S. Venit*
INTRODUCTION
Council Regulation No. 4064/89 (the "Merger Control
Regulation" or the "Regulation")'t entered into force on September 21, 1990. At the time this Article was written the Regulation's substantive test had not yet been applied. This Article's discussion of three issues raised by the Regulation's substantive test must, perforce, be speculative. Part I examines
whether, in evaluating a concentration, the Commission of the
European Communities (the "Commission") is permitted or
required to take into account factors, such as industrial or social policy, that are not, strictly speaking, related to competition law. Part II explores whether "dominant position" has
the same meaning under the Regulation as under Article 86 of
the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community
(the "EEC Treaty" or the "Treaty") 2 and, in particular,
whether the Regulation also applies to concentrations that create, or further narrow, interdependent oligopolies. Part III examines whether the Commission is required to prohibit or
modify every concentration that creates or strengthens a dominant position, or whether it is required to do so only when a
further evaluation indicates that the concentration will result in
effective competition being substantially impeded in all or a
substantial part of the common market. This Article concludes
t A version of this Article will be published in 1990 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. (B.
Hawk ed. 1991). Copyright © Transnational Publications, Inc., 1991.
* Partner, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Resident in Brussels, Belgium; Member,
New York State Bar. The Author would like to thank the Fordham Corporate Law
Institute for permission to make this Article available.
1. Council Regulation No. 4064/89, Oj. L 395/1 (1989), Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 2839, corrected version in Oj. L 257/13 (1990) [hereinafter Merger Control Regulation].
2. Mar. 25, 1957, art. 86, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I1), 298 U.N.T.S.
3 (1958) [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
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with some reflections on market definition, customer dependence and vertical concentrations.
In addressing these issues, it is useful to bear in mind the
complex jurisprudential situation created by the Regulation.
On the one hand, the Regulation is a new legal instrument,
based primarily on Article 235 of the EEC Treaty,' designed to
deal with the lasting structural changes effected by mergers,
acquisitions and other concentrations which raise issues that
differ significantly from the issues raised by abusive conduct
under Article 86. On the other hand, the Regulation employs
terms, such as "dominant position," that are found in the
Treaty. These terms have acquired a meaning in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Communities
(the "Court"), and their meaning will, as a result of the inevitable evolution of case law, continue to develop, and indeed,
may well be influenced by the Regulation. The inherent tension that results from the implicit incorporation of case law,
primarily applied to control abusive conduct, in a statute
whose concern with competitive structure expands the scope
of the EEC Treaty from which that case law takes its point of
departure, inevitably colors and complicates an analysis of the
substantive provisions of the Regulation.
I. THE SUBSTANTIVE TEST COMPETITION LA W OR
OTHER CONCERNS
A. The Assessment of Compatibility
The last two published drafts of the Regulation,4 which
3. Id. art. 235. Recitals 6-8 of the Merger Control Regulation state that in light
of the shortcomings of Articles 85 and 86, there is a need for "a new legal instrument," "principally based on Article 235," to provide for the effective control of
concentrations. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, recitals 6-8, O.J. L 257/13,
at 14. The Regulation does not specify to what extent Articles 85 and 86 apply to
concentrations and thus leaves open the question of the extent to which the Regulation is based on Article 87 rather than Article 235. In light of the first paragraph of
article 3(2), which excludes situations of the type treated in British American Tobacco Co. v. Commission, Joined Cases 142 & 156/84, 1987 E.C.R. 4487, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,405, from the scope of the Regulation, and recitals 24 and 25,
it would appear that the only situations in respect of which the Regulation's basis
resides in Article 87 are the situations envisaged in Europemballage Corp. v. Commission, Case 6/72, 1973 E.C.R. 215, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8171, and joint
bids of the kind that would be covered by recital 24. Merger Control Regulation,
supra note 1, recitals 24 & 25, art. 3(2), OJ. L 257/13, at 15-16, 17.
4. O.J. C 130/4 (1988), art. 2(4); O.J. C 22/14 (1989), art. 2(3).

414 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:412
adopted a two-step approach analogous to the analysis under
Articles 85(1) and 85(3), 5 would have permitted the Commission to authorize concentrations that strengthened or created a
dominant position where certain criteria similar, but not iden6
tical, to those in Article 85(3) were fulfilled.
In contrast to these drafts, the Regulation provides for an
apparently unified appraisal of compatibility which, in a single
analysis, seeks to assess the existence of dominance and to
evaluate its effects. According to the Commission's statements
read into the Council of Ministers (the "Council") minutes of
December 21, 1989, under the Regulation as finally adopted, a
determination of compatibility is merely the opposite of a determination of incompatibility, rather than a derogation from
it. 7
The decision to abandon the derogation approach employed in the final two published drafts is related to two issues.
The first, which has to do with the interrelationship between
European Economic Community ("Community") and national
law, has, insofar as concerns the application of competition law
to concentrations with a Community dimension, been resolved
by article 22(1) of the Regulation. 8 The second issue, discussed below, relates to the substantive evaluation of concentrations and the Commission's discretion to approve concentrations that create or strengthen dominant positions.
5. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 85.
6. For a detailed discussion of the requirements of Article 85, see infra note 8.
7. Declarations, printed in COMM'N, NINETEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
annex, 265-68 (1990) [hereinafter Declarations].

8. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 22(1), O.J. L 257/13, at 24.
During the negotiations that preceded the issuance of the last two published drafts, it
was unclear whether the Member States would agree to a regulation giving, in so
many words, the Commission exclusive jurisdiction over concentrations with a Community dimension. It appears that, at this stage of the negotiations, the Commission
concluded that it would be preferable to apply an approach similar to that under
Article 85(1) and 85(3) in the hope that this parallelism would strengthen the argument that Community law took precedence over national law. Under this approach,
the approval of a concentration would not be tantamount to a negative clearance.
Rather, it would constitute an affirmative decision, within the meaning of Wilhelm v.
Bundeskartellamt, Case 14/68, 1969 E.C.R. 1, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8056,
thus, as in the case of an exemption under Article 85(3), precluding Member States
from taking action that would deprive that derogation of its effects. This issue has
been rendered moot by the inclusion of article 22(1) in the Regulation. See Merger
Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 22(1), O.J. L 257/13, at 24.
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1. Standard of Review
Major conceptual difficulties are posed by the notion of
granting a derogation on competition law grounds to a concentration that would create or strengthen a dominant position. The "exemption" model proposed in the last two published drafts of the Merger Control Regulation tended to suggest that the evaluation of concentrations would not be limited
to competition related grounds, but might also involve a balancing of industrial policy and similar "non-competition" considerations, even though one of the criteria for approval was
that competition not be eliminated to a substantial degree. In
contrast, the one-step approach under which approval and disapproval are merely the opposite sides of the same coin would
appear, as a structural matter, to reduce the scope for such an
approach. Indeed, to the extent that the relevant test is limited
to whether the concentration creates or strengthens a dominant position that leads to a substantial impediment to competition, such an approach would serve to eliminate altogether a
two-step approach.
The issue of whether the assessment of concentrations
should be based solely on competition grounds, or whether it
should also take into account other considerations such as industrial and social policy, was the subject of considerable debate within the Council. Germany and the United Kingdom
strongly supported the Commission's view that no criteria
other than competition law criteria should be considered, in
opposition to the more dirigiste, industrial policy approach
urged by, inter alia, France. 9
Examination of the criteria set forth in article 2(1)(a) and
(b) of the Merger Control Regulation' ° suggests that the Regulation has resolved this debate in favor of a substantive test
9. See Hawk, The EEC Merger Regulation: The First Step Toward One-Stop Merger Control, 59 ANTITRUST LJ. 195, 230 (1990) (describing French approach to merger control).
10. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 2(1)(a)-(b), O.J. L 257/13, at
16. Article 2(l)(a), which states that the appraisal shall take into account "the need
to preserve and develop effective competition within the common market," defines
the standard against which the analysis of compatibility is to be made and, in so doing, appears to rely solely on competition law criteria. Id. art. 2(l)(a). Article 2(l)(b)
then sets forth most of the analytic factors that the Commission and the Court would
normally consider in evaluating whether or not a dominant position exists, which
include the market position of the undertakings concerned, their economic and finan-

416 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 14:412
that is based on competition law considerations. However, an
exception to this approach, whose importance is difficult to assess, has been acknowledged in the Regulation's thirteenth recital. II
2. Technical and Economic Progress
Article 2(1)(b) contains one criterion-"the development
of technical and economic progress"-that evokes industrial
policy concerns. This criterion, which is reminiscent of Article
85(3),12 is subject to the requirement that the development of
such progress be to consumers' advantage and not form "an
obstacle to competition.' 3 This provision is similar, in effect,
to the approach taken in the last published draft of the Regulation. Its inclusion, and, conceivably, the reference to the interests of consumers which precedes it, imply both an efficiency
defense and a balancing approach such as might be found
under Article 85(3). Whether this means that a greater negative impact on competitive structure will be required where
there are some efficiency benefits to a concentration is a subject for speculation. Given the dual requirements, however,
that the contribution to technical and economic progress be to
consumers' advantage and that there be no obstacle to competition, the technical and economic progress "defense" would
appear to be subject to overriding competition law concerns.
As a result, it would appear that this part of article 2(l)(b) of
the Regulation does not create a serious possibility of a derogation from the prohibition set forth in article 2(3). The reasons for this conclusion are two-fold.
First, presumably it would be difficult to conclude that the
development of technical or economic progress resulting from
the concentration would be to the consumers' advantage if the
concentrated entity had the ability to raise price or reduce outcial power, the opportunities available to suppliers and users, their access to supplies
and markets, barriers to entry, and supply and demand trends. Id. art. 2(l)(b).
11. Id. recital 13, O.J. L 257/13, at 15.
12. See EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 85. Declaration 2(d) provides "[tihe Commission considers that the concept of technical and economic progress must be understood in the light of the principles enshrined in Article 85(3) of the Treaty, as
interpreted by the case-law of the Court ofJustice." Declarations, supra note 7, 2(d),
at 266.
13. See Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 2(l)(b), O.J. L 257/13, at
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put. If this assumption is correct, the consumer benefit requirement establishes an effective competition-based limita4
tion on any efficiency or technical progress defense.'
Second, the requirement that the concentration not constitute an "obstacle to competition" suggests that the threshold for "disapproval" under the "balancing" test introduced
by the last phrase of article 2(l)(b) has been set at a lower level
than the threshold for prohibition under articles 2(2) and (3).5
If this is the case, a technical and economic progress "defense"
will be subject to, and have to pass, a stricter standard of competition law review under article 2(l)(b) than that imposed by
article 2(3) before it can be considered as one of the factors
favoring approval of the concentration.
3. The "Spanish" Clause
The only apparent exception to the strict adherence to
competition law criteria is the reference, in the Merger Control
Regulation's thirteenth recital, to the fundamental objectives
of Article 2 of the EEC Treaty, 1 6 including the need to
strengthen the economic and social cohesion of the Community. The inclusion of this recital, apparently at the insistence
of Spain, suggests that the operative provisions of the Merger
Control Regulation are to be interpreted and applied in light
of additional factors insofar as concentrations involve less well14. See Address by Sir Leon Brittan, Centre for Policy Studies, Brussels (Sept.
24, 1990) (quoted in part in Comm'n Press Release, IP (90) 751 (Sept. 24, 1990))

[hereinafter Lord Brittan Address]. The Commissioner, discussing the reference to
technical and economic progress in article 2(1)(b), stated:

I do not see how a dominant position which impedes competition could give
rise to technical or economic progress of the sort which competition policy
could endorse. There may be some short-term technical progress available
to a monopolist, but it would not last for long when one considers the well
known debilitating effect of monopoly. As for economic progress, apart

from monopoly rents which would accrue, there would be no progress at all.
Id.
15. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 2(2)-(3), O.J. L 257/13, at 17.
16. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 2. Article 2 of the EEC Treaty provides that
[t]he Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market
and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States,
to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of eco-

nomic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the states belonging to it.
Id.; see Hawk, supra note 9, at 212.
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developed Member States or the less well-developed regions
of otherwise relatively well-developed Member States. The
Commission has reinforced this impression by a specific reference to this provision in the declarations:
The Commission states that among the factors to be taken
into consideration for the purpose of establishing the compatibility or incompatibility of a concentration-factors as
referred to in Article 2(1) and explained in recital 13-account should be taken in particular of the competitiveness
of undertakings located in regions which are greatly in need
7
of restructuring owing inter alia to slow development.'
The Commission's interpretation of recital 13 suggests
that: (i) it views the reference to economic and social cohesion
in terms of the competitiveness of undertakings in regions of
the Community, including less developed ones, in which restructuring is necessary; and (ii) consistent with the values set
forth in Article 2 of the EEC Treaty, it may be prepared to
place greater emphasis on the need for undertakings in those
regions to reach competitive parity with undertakings in other
areas of the Community. The latter implies that the Commission may accept a "restructuring" or "competitiveness" defense in the case of less developed regions, even though it appears to have rejected such a defense as concerns the competitiveness of Community firms vis-d-vis their non-Community
rivals. 18
How large the "Pandora's box" suggested by the thirteenth recital and the Commission's declaration actually remains to be determined. The Court has indicated that recitals
are relevant to the interpretation of a regulation's substantive
provisions.' 9 However, recitals cannot override the operative
terms of the Merger Control Regulation. Thus, it may be that
the tests in articles 2(2) and (3) limit the potential impact of the
thirteenth recital. Under this approach, the reference to "economic progress" in article 2(l)(b) arguably will be subject to
the requirement that this latter consideration only be given
17. Declarations, supra note 7, 2(a), at 265.
18. For a contrary view on the latter point, see Lever, Substantive Review under the
Merger Regulation: A Pivate Perspective, in 1990 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. ch. 23 (B.
Hawk ed. 1991).
19. Hydrotherm Geritebau GmbH v. Compact de Dott. Ing., Case 170/83, 1984
E.C.R. 2999, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,112.
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weight provided the concentration in question is in the interests of consumers and does not create an obstacle to competition. As a result, it may be that the requirements of article
2(1)(b) trump the thirteenth recital, at least insofar as "economic progress" is concerned. This would still leave unaddressed social (and perhaps economic) cohesion, however, as
well as the values of "harmonious" development and improvement in standards of living referred to in Article 2 of the EEC
Treaty. The possibility thus remains that, notwithstanding the
terms of article 2(l)(a) and (b), there may be some room for
balancing competition and the concerns addressed by Articles
2 and 130a.2 °
The outcome of this apparent clash of values is difficult to
ascertain. Given the questionable social benefits that are to be
derived from monopolies, the need for economic and social
cohesion could be interpreted as itself requiring that there be
workable competition throughout the entire common market,
thus in effect mandating the application of the same competition analysis in all cases. However, the Commission's decision
to make the thirteenth recital the subject of a declaration suggests that the Commission may not share this limited interpretation and that it may seek to give weight to the thirteenth recital by allowing dominant firms to be created or strengthened
in less well-developed regions Where, implicitly, these firms
will not be subjected to competition from firms located elsewhere in the Community. Some of these issues may be
avoided or disguised by taking a long-term view of the relevant
geographic market. It would appear, however, that the thirteenth recital and the Commission's declaration permit considerations other than those of competition law to apply in cases
where a concentration, although having adverse local effects
on competitive structure, would raise the level of competitiveness of the concentrated entity to the level existing in other
geographic markets in the Community.
Mention of something as provocative as a Pandora's box
requires some qualification. Because merger policy relates to
the very structure of industrial organization, it is invariably
linked to policy judgments whose implications either go beyond competition law or at least confront the latter with diffi20. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 2 & 130a.
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cult policy choices. This is particularly so in the case of a community of sovereign nations, at different stages of development, seeking to integrate their economic activities by creating
an internal market. These considerations give rise to important issues both at the technical level of the application of the
Merger Control Regulation-particularly in reference to the
definition of geographic markets-and at the level of policy
concerning, for example, the need to meet international competition or accelerate restructuring in less developed regions.
It would thus be naive to think that merger cases will not raise
important policy issues and in this sense be "political."
In contrast to the United Kingdom, where mergers are ultimately judged on a broader standard of the "public interest,"
and Germany, where the Minister of Economics may override
the prohibition of the Federal Cartel Office for reasons of industrial policy, the Merger Control Regulation does not provide for any institutional mechanism for overriding the Commission's application of the Regulation's competition standards. Thus, whatever "political" balancing, if any, that is
permitted under the Regulation must either take place within
the framework of its technical analysis or be relegated to the
decision-making process of the Commission as a collegial
body. If such balancing does occur at the level of technical
analysis or at the level of the Commission, the situation will be
far different from that, for example, in Germany, where the
greater transparency of the system results in the "political" nature of a decision by the Minister of Economics to override a
prohibition order of the Federal Cartel Office being recognized for what it is.
II. DOES "DOMINANT POSITION" HAVE THE SAME
MEANING UNDER THE REGULATION AS UNDER
ARTICLE 86 OF THE EEC TREATY?
A. The Meaning of Dominance
The principal problem with the Court's definitions of
dominance, aside from the general difficulty of capturing an
elusive concept in words, is that the Court's definitions are not
clearly correlated to market share. Given the likelihood that in
merger cases, greater importance may be attached to market
share both in itself and relative to that of other market partici-
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pants, this significant deficiency may limit the utility of Article
86 as a guide to the application of the Merger Control Regulation's substantive test, although it may be that this lack of correlation is necessary because the market share with which dominance is achieved may vary considerably depending on the nature and structure of the market concerned.
The most commonly accepted definitions of dominance
are set forth by the Court in United Brands Co. v. Commission,2
Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v. Commission, 2 and N. V Nederlandsche
Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Commission.2 3 They emphasize the
ability of the dominant company to hinder the maintenance of
effective competition given its ability to act independently of
competitors, customers and consumers.
These definitions arose in abuse cases and derive from the
definition advanced by the Commission in Continental Can,24 a
merger case involving a "structural" abuse. In that case, the
Commission sought to define dominance:
Enterprises hold a monopoly when they have the possibility of independent conduct which puts them in a position
to act without paying attention to rivals, suppliers or purchasers; it is the same, by reason of their share of the market, or their share of the market in conjuction particularly
with technical knowledge, raw materials, or capital, they
have the chance of determining prices or controlling production or distribution for a significant part of the market of
the products in question; this chance does not necessarilyarise from a total domination allowing the enterprises concerned to eliminate any independent action on the part of
their economic partners, but it is enough, overall, that it is
strong enough to grant these enterprises a global independence of conduct, even if there are variations in the intensity of
their influence in the different sections of the mar25
ket.

The Commission's definition of, and the Court's approach
21. Case 27/76, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 277, $ 65-66, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8429, at 7664-65.
22. Case 85/76, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 520, 38, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8527,
at 7508.
23. Case 322/81, 1983 E.C.R. 3461, 3503, 30, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,031, at 14,494-95.
24. See O.J. L 7/25 (1972), 3 [1972] C.M.L.R. D 11.
25. Id. at 35.
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to, dominance is characterized in subsequent cases by a twofold analysis: (i) identification of the factors-in Continental
Can, market share, technical knowledge, access to raw materials and capital-which may be indicative of dominance; and (ii)
an attempted definition of dominance as a concept-in Continental Can, by reference to independence from competitors,
purchasers and suppliers and "the power to determine price or
control production or distribution for a significant part of the
' 26
products concerned."
The Court's approach in United Brands, Hoffmann-La Roche,
and Michelin has emphasized the ability of a dominant company
to hinder the development of effective competition given its
power to behave independently vis-a-vis competitors, customers and consumers. The Court has refined this notion, no
doubt to take into account less extreme situations than monopoly or near monopoly, by suggesting that dominance need not
be characterized by the total absence of competition. Thus,
the Court has also defined dominance as the power to exercise
''an appreciable influence on the conditions under which that
competition will develop ' 27 and has taken the view that dominance may occur even where "lively competition exists."'2 8 Perhaps more importantly, the Court has added contour to the
26. Id. Not surprisingly, the Commission has sometimes defined dominance to
fit the facts. Thus, in ABG Oil, Oj. L 117/1 (1977), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
9944, in which the abuse arose out of the oil shortage triggered by a decrease in
supplies from the OPEC producers, the Commission understandably dropped the
reference to independence from suppliers from its formulation of dominance. Id.
More recently, in ECS/Akzo, O.J. L 374/1 (1985), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,748, the Commission sought to distance itself from the view that the definition of
dominance is immutable and has defined it in a way that de-emphasizes the independence of the dominant company in respect of pricing and other competitive decisions
by focusing on the ability to exclude effective competition. Id.
It is not clear whether the Commission was seeking in this part of its decision to
broaden the definition of dominance to take in a form of abuse, predatory pricing,
whose very existence, if misunderstood, could call into question the power of the
dominant company to ignore competitors when determining its prices. However, in
addition to reaffirming the fact that dominance may be defined somewhat differently
depending on the type of abuse with which it is confronted, the formulation in Akzo
shifts the focus from the independence "of the dominant company" to the latter's
ability to eliminate rivals or raise barriers to entry. Id.
27. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v. Commission, Case 85/76, 1979 E.C.R. 461,
520, 39, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8527, at 7542-7543.
28. Id. The Court went on to state that the dominant undertaking will "in any
case" be able to act "largely in disregard" of competition from its rivals "so long as
such conduct does not operate to its detriment." Id.
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definitional exercise, without quite pinning down dominance,
by stating that the inability to resist competitive pressure on
prices will "normally" exclude a finding of dominance 9 but
that the absence of supra-competitive or abusive pricing does
not.30
The Merger Control Regulation follows the Commission's
and the Court's approach concerning the factors that may be
indicative of dominance. It makes no attempt, however, to encapsulate that concept in words, other than through references
to the need to preserve and develop effective competition.
The avoidance of any attempt at definition, and the consequential omission of any reference to "independence," may
be viewed as a recognition of the structural rather than the behavioral foundations of the Merger Control Regulation. 3"
The omission of the reference to the ability to act independently may not, however, be all that significant in the case
of single company dominance. Where single company dominance exists, the ability to pursue a course of conduct insulated
from competitive pressures, or at least to determine the condi29. Id. at 532, 71.
30. N.V. Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Commission, Case 322/
81, 1983 E.C.R. 3461, 3511-12, 59, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,031, at 14,49495. In a 1986 study produced for the Commission, Francis Fishwick identified the
following elenlents on the basis of the Court's Article 86 jurisprudence as the key
features of dominance:
- ability of the dominant company to influence the market by its own conduct, unimpeded by competitors;
- dependence of other companies for survival on the dominant enterprise;
economic and financial power which gives the dominant enterprise advantages in any competitive battle.
F. FISHWICK, DEFINITIONS OF THE RELEVANT MARKET
POLICY 15 (1986).

IN

COMMUNITY

COMPETITION

31. For a comparison of the Commission's treatment of independence in two
recent cases, see Rhone Poulenc/Monsanto, Comm'n Press Release, IP (89) 579 (July
25, 1989) and Metaleurop, O.J. L 179/41 (1990),
18, Common Mkt Rep. (CCH)
[1990] 2 CEC 2,033. In Rhone Poulenc, the Commission cited a variety of factors (the
absence of barriers to entry and of brand loyalty, the existence of considerable overcapacity, and the prevalence of imports from third countries which exerted considerable pressure on price) that would restrain the commercial independence of Rhone
Poulenc. Rhone Poulenc/Monsanto, Comm'n Press Release, IP (89) 579 (July 25,
1989). In Metaleurop, the Commission, trying out a style of analysis that may be used
under the Merger Control Regulation, avoided any direct reference to independence
of conduct, referring instead to "the maintenance of effective competition" and the
inability of Metaleurop to have a "decisive influence on the formation of prices,"
although independence is implicitly present in the latter consideration. Metaleurop,
supra, O.J. L 179/41, at 43.
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tions under which competition will take place, will presumably
vary with the extent to which competitive structure has been
weakened. Additionally, this ability may well manifest itself in
the ability to raise prices. Rather, the omission of any reference to independence may be of primary importance for the
treatment of oligopolistic interdependence. In this context,
the definition of dominance under the Merger Control Regulation may differ substantially from that under Article 86, under
which the concept of collective dominance has heretofore
played only a limited role.
B. Application of the Regulation to Concentrations That Create
Market Shares in the Twenty-Five to Forty Percent Range;
Collective Dominance
Leaving aside the issue of the level at which the thresholds
for determining whether a concentration has a Community dimension have initially been set, the potential scope of the
Commission's ability to use merger control as an effective
means of preserving competitive structures is significantly limited by two factors. First, the Court has never found dominance to exist with a market share below forty percent.3 2 Second, in contrast to merger control statutes that create a presumption of dominance at market shares as low as twenty or
thirty-three and one third percent and apply a concept ofjoint
dominance, the Merger Control Regulation makes no explicit
reference to joint dominance. In practice, the only concentrations at risk under the Regulation therefore may be those involving a party that was already the market leader with a market share of forty percent or more, or those that create a new
market leader with such a market share.
The first problem may be resolved by lowering the threshold at which dominance is found to exist to the twenty-five to
32. See United Brands Co. v. Commission, Case 27/76, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 277,
108, at 282, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8429, at 7710, in which the Court stated
that United Brands' market share was always more than forty percent. Id.
In some cases, dominance has been found to exist in respect of a company's own
products regardless of its market share because of customer dependence. Hugin
Kassaregister AB v. Commission, Case 22/78, 1979 E.C.R. 1869, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8524; General Motors Continental NV v. Commission, Case 26/75, 1975
E.C.R. 1367, Common Mkt. Rep (CCH) 8320; British Leyland v. Commission, Case
226/84, 1986 E.C.R. 3263, Common Mkt. Rep (CCH) 14,336.
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forty percent range, or by defining a market narrowly, thus increasing the likelihood of a party's being found to hold a market share of forty percent or more. However, neither of these
approaches would enable the Commission to prohibit a concentration where the concentrated entity was not the market
leader. The latter possibility would require reliance on a theory of collective dominance.
1. Existence of Single Company Dominance with Market
Shares in the Twenty-Five to Forty Percent Range
In Hoffmann-LaRoche, the Court expressly stated that "a
substantial market share as evidence of the existence of a dominant position is not a constant factor and its importance varies
from market to market according to the structure of these markets. ' "3 The Court has never categorically ruled out the possi34
bility of dominance in the twenty-five to forty percent range,
and in certain markets, dominance could occur with market
shares below the forty percent range. A concentration establishing a market share in the twenty-five to forty percent range,
or, as the Merger Control Regulation's fifteenth recital suggests, even in lower ranges, 5 could therefore give rise to a
dominant position.
33. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v. Commission, Case 85/76, 1979 E.C.R. 461,
40, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8527, at 7560.
34. See Metro SB-Gropmarkte v. Commission, Case 75/84, 1986 E.C.R. 3021,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,326 (holding that SABA, German market leader with
ten percent market share in market for highly interchangeable products was not dominant); see also Alsatel v. Novasam SA, Case 247/86, 1988 E.C.R. 5297, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) [1990] 1 CEC 248 (Commission took view that Alsatel, which had a
thirty-three percent market share in Alsace, was not dominant in light of fact that
French PTT had equivalent market share there). The Commission has warned that
dominance cannot be ruled out in the twenty to forty percent range. See COMM'N,
TENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
150 n.4 (1981).
35. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, recital 15, O.J. L 257/14, at 15.
The fifteenth recital states that a concentration will benefit from a presumption of
compatibility where the aggregate market share of the parties does not exceed twenty
five percent, thus leaving open the possibility that single company dominance may be
deemed to exist where the concentrated entity's market share is in the twenty-five to
forty percent range. Id. Indeed, the fifteenth recital would also leave open the possibility that in markets characterized by unusual structures of supply and demand,
dominance might be found even below twenty five percent. Id. As Lever has observed, the reassurance provided by the fifteenth recital is hardly that. Lever, supra
note 18.
520,
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2. Collective Dominance
In its discussion of a 1986 study on the concept of shared
dominance and its relevance to competition policy, 36 the Commission stated that one of the principal objectives behind the
then-proposed merger regulation was to prevent the creation
of situations that would result in stable collusion between
oligopolists. 3 7 The study concluded that the two essential features of such shared dominance were:
(i) a concentrated market in which a small number of enterprises account for most of the turnover without any single
enterprise holding a dominant position; and
(ii) a high degree of interdependence concerning the decision-making processes of these enterprises.
With regard to the latter, the study noted that the reduction of competition in a tight oligopoly does not necessarily
lead to the appearance of tacit collusion. The latter "may,
however, arise from the fact that members of the oligopoly become aware of their interdependence and of the probably unfavourable consequences of adopting a competitive attitude."' 38 Even prior to the adoption of the Merger Control
Regulation, therefore, the Commission may have begun to reflect on the possibility that a merger control regulation might
be used to attack mergers in concentrated markets, even where
the concentration did not create or strengthen an individual
dominant position. Additionally, it may have envisioned reliance on a theory of collective dominance to do so, even where
there was no prior history of collusion.
Reliance on a theory of collective dominance to extend the
application of the Merger Control Regulation to narrow oligopolies would represent a major development in Community
law. It is therefore worth examining the concept of collective
dominance under Community law and other legal systems.3 9
However, when doing so it should be borne in mind that, until
36. E. KANTZENBACH & J.

KRUSE,

KOLLEKTIVE MARKTBEHERRSCHUNG:

KONZEPT UND SEINE ANWENDBARKEIT FOR DIE WETBEWERBSPOLITIK

37. See
38. Id.

COMM'N, SIXTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY

DAS

(1987).
331-33 (1987).

331.

39. For a general review of this issue, see Flint, Abuse of A Collective Dominant

Position, in LEGAL ISSUES IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 21 (1978/2) and Sodenheim, Collective Dominance Revisited: An Analysis of the EC Commission's New Concepts of Oligopoly
Control, [19901 1 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 28.
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now, collective dominance has only been considered under
Community law from the perspective of Articles 85 and 86 of
the EEC Treaty. Given the Merger Control Regulation's reliance on Article 235 and the requirements of effective structural control inherent in merger regulation, the past dialogue
between the Commission and the Court concerning the concept of collective dominance may not be decisive for the resolution of the status of collective dominance under the Regulation.
a. The Concept of Collective Dominance in Other Legal
Systems
Although not a well-developed concept under Community
law, the concept of collective or joint dominance is recognized
by other legal systems. Thus, the O.E.C.D. Glossary of Terms
Relating to Restrictive Business Practices defines a dominating
position as "[t]he position occupied either (a) by a single enterprise, or (b) by a group of enterprises, between which no
effective competition exists, which does not encounter effective
40
competition in a market."

The U.K. Fair Trading Act 1973 defines collective dominance as existing where:
(c) at least one-quarter of all the goods of that description
which are supplied in the United Kingdom are supplied by
one and the same group consisting of two or more such persons [(not being an interconnected group of bodies corporate) who whether voluntarily or not, and whether by agreement or not, so conduct their respective affairs as in any way
to prevent, restrict or distort competition in connection
with the production or supply of goods of that description,
whether or not they themselves are affected by the competition and whether the competition is between persons interested as producers or suppliers or between persons interested as customers of producers or suppliers], or are supplied to members of one and
the same group consisting of
two or more such persons. 4 1
In Germany, section 22 of the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerb40. O.E.C.D. GLOSSARY OF TERMS RELATING TO RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRAC-

TICEs, at 13.

41. Fair Trading Act 1973, ch. 41 (U.K.).
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sbeschrankungen (the "GWB")

42

provides that:

(1) An enterprise is market dominating within the meaning
of [the GWB] insofar as, in its capacity as a supplier or purchaser of a certain type of goods or commercial services,
1. It has no competitor or is not exposed to any substantial competition, or...
(2) Two or more enterprises shall also be deemed market
dominating insofar as, in regard to a certain type of goods
or commercial services, no substantial competition exists
between them, for factual reasons, either in general, or in
specific markets, and they jointly meet the requirements of
subsection (1).43
Section 22(3) of the GWB provides for a rebuttable presumption of dominance:
(3) It shall be presumed that
1. an enterprise is market dominating within the meaning
of subsection (1), if it has a market share of at least onethird for a certain type of goods or commercial services; this
presumption shall not apply when the enterprise recorded a
turnover of less than DM 250 million in the last completed
business year;
2. the conditions specified in subsection (2) are met if, in
regard to a certain type of goods or commercial services,
a) three or [fewer] enterprises have a combined market
share of 50% or over, or
b) five or [fewer] enterprises have a combined market
share of two-thirds or over; this presumption shall not apply, insofar as enterprises are concerned which recorded
turnovers of less than DM 100 million in the last completed
business year .... 44
Although the U.K. statute refers to the possibility of collective dominance arising out of a collusive agreement, and
although it is formulated by reference to conduct rather than
structure, the reference to involuntary action suggests that the
statute would also apply to unconscious parallelism. For its
part, the GWB takes a purely structural approach, specifying
two types of narrow oligopolies-three company and five com42. July 27, 1957, BUNDESGESETZBLATr,
Dec. 22, 1989, BGBL.I, S.2486 (Ger.).
43. Id.
44. Id.

TEIL

1 [BGBL.I], S.1081, as amended
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pany-which, if specified joint market share thresholds are satisfied, give rise to a presumption of joint market power.
Community law has tended to rely on either customer dependency or collusive conduct as the basis for a finding ofjoint
dominance, rather than on structural presumptions based on
objective factors such as market share.45 However, passages
from the Sixteenth Report on Competition indicate that, in the
context of merger control, the Commission's approach may be
a structural one.46
b. The Concept of Collective Dominance in Community Law
i. The Commission's View
Insofar as Article 86 is concerned, the theory of collective
dominance finds its basis in that Article's laconic reference to
the abuse of a dominant position by one or more companies
holding such a position in all or a substantial part of the European common market. The Commission first made reference
to the theory ofjoint dominance in 1973 in the so-called Sugar
Cases.47 In the Sugar cases, the Commission treated as jointly
dominant two Dutch producers who had allegedly coordinated
their marketing activities. The validity of the Commission's
basing joint dominance on the existence of collusion was not
addressed by the Court, which found that the concerted practices had not been adequately established.4
In the ABG Oil Case,49 the Commission, relying on a theory
of customer dependence in a situation of scarcity, concluded
that each of the suppliers of motor spirit held a dominant position vis-d-vis one of their traditional customers.5 0 However,
not all the companies had adopted the same behavior vis-d-vis
the customer, ABG. The Commission's case was therefore directed only at the alleged individual abuse by the supplier,
British Petroleum, which substantially reduced its supplies to
45. See ABG Oil, OJ. L 117/1 (1977), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 9944; Flat
Glass, OJ. L 33/44 (1989).
46. COMM'N, SIXTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY $$ 39 & 331-33
(1986).
47. O.J. L 140/17 (1973), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 9570.
48. "Suiker Unie" UA v. Commission, Case 40/73, 1975 E.C.R. 1663, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8334.
49. O.J. L 117/1 (1977), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 9944.
50. Id. O.J. L 117/1, at 9, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 9944.
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ABG, to a greater degree than in the case of its other customers.
More recently, in Magill TV Guide,5 three television networks sued to enforce their copyrights to prevent Magill from
publishing a comprehensive weekly containing the three networks' program listings.5 2 The networks arguably held a collective dominant position in light of their de facto and de jure
monopoly over their weekly program listings. Nevertheless,
perhaps because the Commission's case was already burdened
with sufficient difficulties related to the copyrights held by the
three networks, or perhaps because there was no evidence of
collusion between the three companies, the Commission's case
was based on a theory of individual abuse by each of the three
companies rather than abuse of their collective dominant position.5
The Commission has elaborated a theory of collective
dominance most fully in its Italian Flat Glass' 4 decision. In that
case, the Commission relied on the theory of collective dominance arising out of collusion, and accused three members of a
narrow oligopoly who had allegedly engaged in a price fixing
and quota cartel of having thereby also abused a collectively
held dominant position. 5 Under the Commission's theory,
the three Italian flat glass producers concerned, Fabbrica
Pisani ("FP"), Societa Italina Vetro-SIV ("SIV"), and Vernante
Pennitalia ("VP"), as a result of their collusive behavior and
agreements, "presented themselves on their market as a single
entity and not as individuals. ' 56 Consequently, the three producers collectively enjoyed a degree of independence from
competitive pressures that enabled them to impede effective
competition. Because the theory of joint dominance relied on
51. OJ.L 78/43 (1989).
52. Id. 20, 0.J. L 78/43, at 49.
53. Id. 22, 0.J. L 78/43, at 49.
54. O.J. L 33/44 (1989).
55. Since the Commission's case under Article 86 was dependent on and did not
strengthen its Article 85 case and since the Commission did not impose fines for the
additional violation of Article 86, its decision to raise the issue of joint dominance
would appear to be more theoretical or tactical than anything else. The interpretation that the Commission may have been focusing on merger control is reinforced by
the fact that the United Kingdom has taken the unusual step of intervening in the
case, which does not involve any U.K. companies, to challenge the Commission's
decision in respect of Article 86.
56. Flat Glass, 79, 0.J. L 33/44, at 66.
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by the Commission is based on pre-existing collusion, it involves a kind of circularity in that the collusive phenomena violative of Article 85(1) constitute both the source of the collectively held dominant position and the abuse.
The Commission has also recently referred to the theory
ofjoint dominance in Alsatel v. Novasam SA .Y Alsatel involved a
national court reference concerning whether contractual conditions specifying the duration, cost, and obligations accepted
by lessees of terminal equipment, and imposed by one of the
private French regional telephone installation companies, violated Article 86. In its submissions to the Court, the Commission asserted that the Court has "expressly accepted" in the
59
Sugar Cases 58 and Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro-SB-GromBdrkte
that a collective dominant position could exist between the
members of the same group or as a result of collusion between
independent companies. The Commission went farther than it
had gone in Italian Flat Glass and based its theory ofjoint dominance on the existence of parallelism of conduct. 60 The Court
did not address the issue of dominance, taking the view that it
did not have the authority in an Article 177 reference to consider issues under Article 85 that posed questions exclusively
under Article 86.
ii. The Court's Approach

The Court of Justice has not been particularly supportive
of the Commission's attempts, insofar as Article 86 is concerned, to formulate a theory of collective dominance based on
collusion, dependence, or conscious parallelism. In HoffmannLa Roche, the Court, in the context of Article 86, appeared to
57. Case 247/86, 1988 E.C.R. 5297, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1990] 1 CEC
248.
58. O.J. L 140/17 (1973), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9570.
59. Case 78/70, 1971 E.C.R. 487, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8106.
60. Alsatel v. Novasam SA, Case 247/86, 1988 E.C.R. 5297, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) [1990] 1 CEC 248 (report for hearing). The Commission alleged that A]satel's behavior could also result in a violation of Article 85 if, as a result of a concerted practice between them, the various regional leasing and installation companies all employed the same contractual terms without any technical necessity for their
doing so. Although its argumentation is somewhat fragmentary, the Commission
sought to distinguish between an abuse of a collective dominant position under Article 86, which could be based on the mere existence of non-collusive, parallel behavior, and a violation of Article 85(1), which would require a concerted practice. Id.
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reject a theory ofjoint dominance based on conscious parallelism. The Court stated that:
A dominant position must also be distinguished from parallel courses of conduct which are peculiar to oligopolies in
that in an oligopoly the courses of conduct interact, while in
the case of an undertaking occupying a dominant position
the conduct of the undertaking which derives profits from
that position is to a great extent determined unilaterally."'
In other cases, which are of less relevance to the application of the Merger Control Regulation to oligopolies, the
Court has sought to maintain the distinction between Articles
85 and 86. In Ziichner v. Bayerische Vereinsbank,6 2 an Article 177
reference concerning an alleged concerted practice among
German banks to debit a uniform service charge on certain
transactions, the Court distinguished between Article 85,
which deals with concerted practices, and Article 86, which
deals with the abuse of a dominant position. The Court held
that Article 86 does not apply to concerted practices. The
same distinction was drawn by the Court in Bodson v. S.A.
Pompes Funbres des Re'gions Libire-es,6 3 in which the Court again
emphasized the distinction between Article 85, applicable to
concerted practices and agreements between independent
companies, and Article 86, which could apply to anticompetitive behavior by companies belonging to the same group.
In Ahmed Saeed v. Zentrale,' the Court slightly modified its
view and did indicate that both Articles 85 and 86 may apply
concurrently to a price fixing arrangement. However, in doing
so the Court stated that this would be the case where the dominant company succeeds in imposing its pricing policy on its
non-dominant competitors. 65 This approach would not be
broad enough to apply to a price fixing cartel among members
61. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v. Commission, Case 85/76, 1979 E.C.R. 461,
39, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8527, at 7543.
62. Case 172/80, 1981 E.C.R. 2021, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8706.
63. Case 30/87, 1988 E.C.R. 2479, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1990] 1 CEC 3.
The Court's pronouncements in Bodson are perhaps most significant because
they tend to breathe some life into the intra-group conspiracy theory by making it
clear that the requirement of control by the parent over its subsidiaries is a real one
which should be verified.
64. Case 66/86, 1989 E.C.R. 803, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1989] 2 CEC
654.
65. Id. 46.
520,
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of a narrow oligopoly, such as that alleged in Italian Flat Glass,
where no single company is dominant.66
Alsatel suggests that the Commission may, in the past, have
been motivated by a desire to develop a theory which would
enable it to attack, under Article 86, anti-competitive pricing
strategies absent any proof of collusion. The Commission's
debate with the Court over collective dominance in the context
of Articles 85 and 86, however, was probably also intended to
develop the legal and theoretical basis for expanding the scope
of Article 86 as an instrument for merger control, in the event
the Council refused to adopt a regulation.
The United Kingdom has intervened in the Italian Flat
Glass case specifically for the purpose of contesting the Commission's views on collective dominance. It is therefore likely
that the Court of First Instance, and perhaps ultimately the
Court of Justice, will be required to pronounce on the Commission's approach to joint dominance in the context of Articles 85 and 86. However, given the adoption of the Merger
Control Regulation and its reliance on Article 235, neither the
Court's resolution of Italian Flat Glass, which involved the application of Articles 85 and 86 to the same behavior, nor the
Court's approach in earlier cases will necessarily resolve
whether the Regulation can be used to prohibit the creation or
narrowing of a tight oligopoly.
C. Legal Basisfor the Applicability of the Regulation to Narrow
Oligopolies
Even though the Merger Control Regulation, in contrast
to Article 86, makes no reference to joint dominance, it would
appear that a legal basis may exist for the potential applicability of the Regulation to narrow oligopolies. Article 2(1) requires that the Commission take into account the need to preserve and maintain effective competition. Since there is arguably little room for price competition in certain narrow
oligopolies, the Regulation, and ultimately Article 3(f) of the
Treaty,6 7 could provide a basis for prohibiting concentrations
in such oligopolistic markets. Moreover, to the extent that the
interdependent pricing decisions of oligopolists are likely to
66. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
67. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 3(f).
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lead to supra-competitive prices,68 a case can be made for the
application of the Merger Control Regulation to concentrations that create or further reduce narrow oligopolies.
The Court's judgment in Hoffmann-La Roche, apparently
rejecting the notion that Article 86 applies to oligopolistic interdependence, and its judgment in Ahmed Saeed need not necessarily be regarded as dispositive. First, even if the Court
were to hold that Article 86 does not apply to collective dominance, or does not apply to the non-collusive interdependent
conduct of oligopolists, the ruling would not necessarily affect
the scope of the Merger Control Regulation since it is based
on Article 235. Second, the Court's dictum in Hoffman-La
Roche, indicating that oligopolistic interdependence does not
give rise to a dominant position, was uttered in the context of a
case dealing with abuse and thus may not be relevant to the
Merger Control Regulation's structural concerns. Third, the
Court's pronouncement in Hoffman-La Roche can be interpreted
as an attempt to create a kind of parity between Articles 85 and
86 by providing a basis for a holding that mere conscious par-

allelism without some evidence of active collusion should not
be deemed to violate either Article 85(1)69 or Article 86. Such
68. This is also likely to happen in the case of a monopolist's pricing. Gyselen,
Abuse of Monopoly Power Within the Meaning of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty: Recent Developments, in 1989 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 597 (B. Hawk ed. 1990).
69. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 85(1). As it presently stands, Community law
distinguishes between legal, conscious parallelism where there are no contacts or
exchanges of information and where the behavior of the parties concerned is consistent with economic theory, and illegal parallel pricing behavior where there have
been information exchanges, including the publication of prices, or other contacts or
where the behavior in question is not rationally explicable by economic theory.
Thus, although in Imperial Chemicals Industries, Ltd. v. Commission, Case 48/69,
1972 E.C.R. 619, 655, 64, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8161, at 8020-22, in which
there were contacts, the Court appeared to define a concerted practice broadly
enough to include conscious parallelism, in the Sugar Cases, the Court relied heavily
on the question of whether there has been contact between competitors in distinguishing between permissible parallel conduct and prohibited concerted practices,
stating that
[a]lthough it is correct to say that this requirement of independence does
not deprive economic operators of the right to adapt themselves intelligently to the existing and anticipated conduct of their competitors, it does,
however, strictly preclude any direct or indirect contact between such operators, the object or effect whereof is either to influence the conduct on the
market of an actual or potential competitor or to disclose to such a competitor the course of conduct which they themselves have decided to adopt or
contemplate adopting on the market.
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an approach would not exclude use of the Merger Control
Regulation to limit the negative effects of narrow oligopolies.
Indeed, the determination that Articles 85 and 86 should not
apply to non-collusive parallelism would arguably create the
need for a structural approach to the problem, which can be
provided under the Merger Control Regulation. Arguably, a
structural approach is also appropriate since it would not be
justifiable to sanction, under Articles 85 and 86, the non-collusive behavior of oligopolists who are only responding intelligently to market conditions. 0
As a result, it would appear that the Court's jurisprudence
under Article 86 does not necessarily constitute an obstacle to
the application of the Regulation to narrow oligopolies. Indeed, it may provide a rationale for the application of the Regulation to interdependent oligopolies.
D. Situations in Which the Regulation May Be Applied to Oligopolies
Not all narrow oligopolies will invariably give rise to the
kind of interdependence that eliminates or severely reduces
price competition. Rather, certain conditions presumably
would need to be met before the Merger Control Regulation
should be applied to narrow oligopolies. There is probably
general agreement 7 that tacit collusion and conscious or unEuropean Sugar Industry, 0.J. L 140/17 (1973), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9570.
Similarly, in Woodpulp, 0.J. L 85/1 (1985)
85, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,654, the Commission has relied to a significant degree both on economic arguments to the effect that the parallel behavior in question could not be explained by
market conditions and on information exchanges consisting, inter alia, of the advance
publication in the trade press of prices. Id.
70. E. KANTZENBACH &J. KRUSE, supra note 36. In their study, Kantzenbach and
Kruse conclude:
Damit ist die Verhaltenskontrolle an der Grenze dessen, was den Unternehmen allenfalls noch zum Vorwurf gemacht und sanktioniert werden
kann. Implizite Kollusion, insbesondere das bewufte Parallelverhalten,
setzen keinerlei Abstimmung der Partner voraus. Die Verhaltensweise folgt
ausschlieflich aus der Erkenntnis der oligopolistischen Interdependenz und
ist ffir die Unternehmen unter bestimmten Umstinden die einzig rationale
Konsequenz daraus. Eine Sanktionierung dieses Verhaltens wiirde einer
Verpflichtung der Unternehmen zur Ignoranz oder zur Irrationalitat
gleichkommen und wire schon deshalb wenig erfolgversprechend. Eine
Ausdehnung der Verhaltenskontrolle auf implizite Kollusion kommt
deshalb nicht in Betracht.
Id. at 133.
71. Id. at 65-66; see Flint, supra note 39, at 77. Flint notes that parallelism of
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conscious parallelism are most likely to occur in markets characterized by the following conditions:
a limited number of participants in a stagnant, "mature"
market;
a standardized, commodity-like product, or a product
based on standardized inputs or some other factor yielding
similar and transparent cost structures;
pricing transparency;
substantial barriers to entry; and
inelasticity of demand and inability of the oligopolists to
shift production to other products.
-

According to the Commission's 1986 study, merger control could be used in the markets which have or which would,
as a result of a concentration, acquire the above-mentioned
characteristics. 72 Merger control could thus avoid the anticompetitive but non-collusive effects of narrow oligopolies

by:
prohibiting the creation ofjoint dominance by means of
concentration, in particular by horizontal mergers;
prohibiting the acquisition of "fringe" firms that create
some possibility of competition by members of the market
dominating oligopoly; and
keeping open the possibility of effective competition
from "newcomers" by preventing the creation or heightening of entry barriers through concentrations, including vertical and conglomerate mergers."
-

Application of the Merger Control Regulation to narrow
oligopolies will not prevent the creation of anticompetitive
behavior is likely to be the inevitable outcome of a market structure in which a great
deal of market power is concentrated in relatively few hands, entry barriers towards
new sellers are high, and where the product in question is relatively standardized. Id.
The parallelism will also depend to a certain degree on a reasonably steady demand
industry-wide, although the product itself will be highly sensitive to any price alteration by an individual seller. Id.
Most of these factors are identified by Kantzenbach and Kruse, although they
take a different view of the effects of overcapacity which they believe decrease the
likelihood of collusion. E. KANTZENBACH & J. KRUSE, supra note 36, at 65-66.
72. COMM'N, SIXTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
323-33 (1987).
73. See E. KANTZENBACH & J. KRUSE, supra note 36, at 136-38. Conglomerate
merger theories are currently out of favor in the United States. Thus, the reference
to the possible prohibition of vertical or conglomerate mergers, which is one of the
principal ways by which oligopolists compete with each other, may be questionable.
Should the Commission bring such cases, they will no doubt prove controversial.
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market structures that arise out of the organic growth of competitors in certain markets. It may, however, enable the Commission to reach problems that have heretofore been outside
the scope of its powers. Such an approach would be consistent
with the models provided by other competition laws, including
those in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany,
and could have wide-reaching effects. 4
III. THE NATURE OF THE ANALYSIS UNDER ARTICLE 2:
MUST ALL CONCENTRATIONS THAT CREATE OR
STRENGTHEN A DOMINANT POSITION
BE PROHIBITED?
The analysis under article 2 requires the Commission to
take into account the factors listed in articles 2(1)(a) and (b) in
order to determine whether the concentration has given rise to
or strengthened a dominant position, as a result of which competition will be significantly impeded in all or a substantial part
of the common market. Leaving aside the issues raised by the
thirteenth recital, it would appear from the factors listed in articles 2(1)(a) and (b) that the analysis under the Merger Control Regulation will involve three steps. First, the relevant
product and geographic markets must be defined. Second, a
determination will have to be made as to whether, in light of
actual or potential competition within and from outside the
Community and the factors listed in article 2(1)(b), the concentration would give rise to or strengthen a dominant position.
Lastly, it will be necessary to ascertain whether that dominant
74. The level of control that should be applied to oligopolies depends in part on
whether an antitrust authority should attach primary importance to price competition
or whether other forms of competition (advertising, product innovation, service, or
increased efficiency in production methods that permits price reductions) would be
sufficient to ensure consumer welfare.
The significance for consumer welfare of non-price competition is a controversial issue and will, in any event, vary depending on the market. Competition authorities have, on occasion, concluded that in some circumstances the often intense competition concerning advertising and product innovation is no substitute for price
competition and indeed has the effect of maintaining high prices by acting as a barrier to entry, American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946), or by
itself increasing costs and, as a result, prices. See MONOPOLIES COMMISSION, A RE.
PORT ON THE SUPPLY OF HOUSEHOLD DETERGENTS (London 1966), cited in Flint, supra
note 39, at 52. In such cases, it would appear that the residual non-price competition
exposes consumers to the same or similar risks of price and other forms of exploitation by the oligopolists as would be the case if they were confronted by a monopolist.
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position would significantly impede effective competition in all
or a substantial part of the common market.7 5
The foregoing conclusion is based on two assumptions.
First, the reference to technical and economic progress in article 2(1)(b) does not permit the Commission to engage in a balancing of positive and negative factors, or to allow a concentration that would create or strengthen a dominant position on
the ground that it hinders technical or economic progress.76
The second assumption is that the reference in articles
2(2) and (3) to effective competition being significantly impeded in the common market means that: (i) at the very least,
the Merger Control Regulation includes an appreciability test
that would require the Commission to examine whether a preexisting dominant position has been appreciably strengthened;
and (ii) the Regulation goes even further to involve an additional determination as to whether the dominant position that
has been created or strengthened is likely to impede significantly the development of effective competition in the future.7 7
Under this latter interpretation, a finding that a dominant position has been created or strengthened in more than a de minimis
fashion by the concentration would be insufficient for a determination that the concentration should be prohibited or modified. Rather, it would be necessary to conclude further that
this dominant position would act as a significant impediment
to the preservation or development of effective competition.
Under this approach, the Commission would be required to
make a considerably more complex determination concerning
the long-term adverse structural effects of the dominant position that has been created or strengthened.7 8
75. See Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 2(1)(a) & (b), OJ. L 257/
13, at 16.
76. See supra notes 4-20 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
78. This latter interpretation of the significance of the "additional language" in
article 2(2) and (3) is not without its difficulties given the Court's equation, in cases
involving abuse, of dominance with an absence of effective competition. This suggests that the words following "as a result of which" merely define the term "dominant position" as established by the Court's jurisprudence without adding any qualification or test. Nevertheless, merger analysis is predictive and involves an assessment, inter alia, of contestability, the likelihood of market entry in the future, and
market developments which may require that less importance be attached to the market share that may be attained as a result of a concentration. For its part, the Corn-

1990-1991]

EVALUATION OF CONCENTRATIONS

439

Like the Court in Continental Can, articles 2(2) and (3) focus on the efects of the creation or strengthening of the dominant position and not on the dominant position itself. This
difference in focus, the nature of the compatibility analysis
under articles 2(l)(a) and (b), and the practical necessity of a
flexible approach, reinforce the conclusion that a per se approach, under which all concentrations giving rise to or
strengthening dominant positions would be automatically
deemed to result in a significant impediment to effective competition, may not be intended by the Merger Control Regulation.
As a result, the significant impediment of competition referred to in article 2(3) may not be synonymous with dominance in every case, although it is likely to be where large market shares exist and are sustainable. Such an approach should
provide the Commission with a certain degree of flexibility, beyond that which can be achieved through market definition, 79
by providing for an assessment, in light of the factors listed in
article 2(1)(b), of whether dominance exists or has been appreciably strengthened.8 0 Such flexibility may be desirable because the assessment of compatibility involves an uncertain
mission appears to have accepted this approach. See Lord Brittan Address, supra note
14. Commissioner Sir Brittan stated that
just as under Article 86 the analysis goes on to consider the abuse of the
dominant position, here too dominant position is not the end of the matter
and we have to consider the impediment to competition which the dominant
The addition of the impediment to competition
position may create ....
test reminds us that market dominance is a dynamic concept which must be
considered over a certain period of time. It is the impact of the dominant
position on competition and on the ability of companies to contest or enter
a particular market which concerns us. Relatively high market shares, together with other factors which suggest dominance may not in themselves
necessarily be decisive considerations if the market under examination is
genuinely open to competition. Nevertheless, I accept the general prejudice
of competition policy that high market shares, maintained over a period of
time, suggest that a market is not contestable, even if this is not to be regarded as an irrebuttable presumption.
Id.
79. See, e.g., COMM'N, TENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 157 (1981) (Baxter Travenol/Smith Kline RIT); COMM'N, NINTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
132 (1980) (Coats Patons Ltd./Gutermann & Co.); COMM'N, FOURTEENTH REPORT ON
110 (1985) (Pont-i-Mousson/Stanton & Stavely).
COMPETITION POLICY
109 (1985)
80. See COMM'N, FOURTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
(Ashland Oil Inc./Cabot Co.); COMM'N, TWELFrH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
103 (1983) (Eagle Star/Allianz Versicherung).
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prediction as to how markets and undertakings will perform
and behave. It may also be preferable to prohibition or divestiture in hard cases given the possibility that Article 86 may subsequently be applied should the concentrated undertaking

seek to abuse its market position.8 '
IV. CONCENTRATION ANALYSIS AND POLICY UNDER
THE REGULATION
A. Factors That Will Be Taken into Consideration in Assessing
Dominance and Compatibility
Article 2(1)(a) and (b) lists the essential factors that will be
taken into account for the purpose of evaluating concentrations. It does not, however, explain how these factors will be
applied. The following discussion briefly reviews past application of the factors and some of the problems that have arisen
with regard to them.
1. Market Definition Under the Regulation
To determine whether a concentration should be prohibited or permitted, the Commission needs to form a view as to
whether dominance exists or has been strengthened. In order
to do so, it will, as under Article 86, need to define the relevant
product and geographic markets.
The Commission's approach to market analysis under Ar,tide 86 has been criticized as being goal-oriented because it
defines the market from the perspective of the abuse.8 2 Under
the Regulation, the structural concerns central to concentra81. Although there may be some danger in relying on pre-Regulation cases decided under Article 86, the foregoing interpretation is to some extent supported by
the Commission's own prior administrative practice in several cases. See, e.g.,
COMM'N, EIGHTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 9 146-48 (1978) (KSH/AVEBE
and Michelin/Actor); COMM'N, TENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1 152-56
(1980) (Michelin/Kl~ber-Colombes and BSN-Gervais-Danone/Pilkington); COMM'N,
TWELFTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY $T 104-06 (1982) (initial assessment of the
British Sugar/Berisford acquisition); COMM'N, EIGHTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 81 (1989) (British Airways/British Caledonian). In these cases the Commission either has not opposed concentrations that strengthened or created dominant
positions or has taken the view that although pre-existing dominant positions may
have been strengthened to some extent, it was not necessary to prohibit the concentration.
82. See Fox, Abuse of A Dominant Position Under the Treaty of Rome - A Comparison
With U.S. Law, in 1983 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 367, 368 (B. Hawk ed. 1984).
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tion analysis are referred to explicitly in and are the central
features of article 2(l)(a) and (b). These concerns suggest that
the analysis under the Merger Control Regulation should be
more objective because the goal under the Regulation is to assess the impact of the concentration on the market in which it
occurs, rather than to define a market in order to prohibit an
abuse.
a. The Relevant Product Market
i. Demand-Side Substitution

Under Article 85, the relevant product market has been
defined in terms of the substitutability of goods viewed from
the consumer's perspective.8 3 In Eurofix-Banco v. Hilti,8 4 the

Commission suggested a practical resolution to the difficulties
in applying the concept of demand-side substitutability by relying on the existence, or non-existence, of cross-elasticity of demand. 5 A similar approach was followed in Tetra Pak I (BTG
license). 86 Arguably, the test of cross-elasticity of demand provides a satisfactory way of implementing the demand-side substitution test. This approach has been deemed to be an appropriate one even by those who oppose the notion of taking supply-side substitutability into account for purposes of defining
the relevant product market.8 7
ii. Supply-Side Substitution

The Commission's decision in ContinentalCan was reversed
because the Commission had failed, when attempting to define
the relevant product market, to take into account supply-side
substitutability.88 Similarly, in N. V Nederlandsche Banden-Indus83. Comm'n Regulation No. 1983/83, 0.J. L 173/1 (1983), 2 Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 2730; Comm'n Notice of Sept. 3, 1986 concerning agreements of minor importance which do not fall under Art. 85(1) of Treaty Establishing EEC, 0.J. C
231/2 (1986), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2700.
84. OJ. L 65/19 (1988), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,976.
85. Id. 60 0.J. L 65/19, at 32.
86. 0.J. L 272/27 (1988), 30, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1990] 2 CEC 409.
87. Fishwick and the German Monopolies Commission have both accepted the
U.S. Justice Department approach under which Product B will be a substitute for
Product A if B's existence will prevent a five percent rise in the relative price of A
because within one year of such price rise a substantial proportion of demand would
be shifted from A to B. See F. FIsHwIcK, supra note 30, at 38.
88. Europemballage Corp. v. Commission, Case 6/72, 1973 E.C.R. 215, 34,
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trie Michelin v. Commission,8 9 in the context of a discussion of the
need to define the relevant market, the Court stated that:
For this purpose, therefore, an examination limited to the
objective characteristics only of the relevant products cannot be sufficient: the competitive conditions and the structure of supply and demand on the market must also be
taken into consideration.90
The Court also noted that there was no elasticity of supply
between tires for heavy vehicles and automobile tires, given
the significant difference in production techniques and in the
plant tools required for their manufacture. 9 '
Despite these clear indications that supply-side substitutability should be considered in defining the relevant

product market, the Commission has, except in Tetra Pak and
Hilti, generally tended to rely exclusively on demand-side sub-

stitutability as the sole criterion for defining the relevant product market, while taking supply-side substitutability into account only for the purpose of determining whether the market
power of the company in question is subject to limitation by
the potential competition that may result from supply-side substitution.9 2 This approach has been defended on the grounds
that supply-side substitution should not be considered for the
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8171, at 8302 (known as Continental Can). The Court
stated that there were indications in the decision "which make one doubt whether the
three [product] markets [defined by the Commission] are to be considered separately
from other markets for light metal containers." Id.
89. Case 322/81, 1983 E.C.R. 3461, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,031.
90. Id. at 37, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,031, at 14,515.
91. Id. at 41, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,031, at 14,515-16.
92. See BPB Industries plc, O.J. L 10/50 (1989). In that case, the Commission
took the view that there was no need to take into account the competition offered by
wet plasterboard for purposes of defining the relevant product market. Rather, the
Commission stated that any competitive pressure from other products could be adequately taken into account when considering whether a dominant position exists. It
would appear that the Commission may seek to apply this approach under the
Merger Control Regulation. In particular, the notification form to be used under the
Regulation defines the relevant product market as follows: "A relevant product market comprises all those products and services which are regarded as interchangeable
or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products' [sic] characteristics,
their prices and their intended use." Form Relating to the Notification of a Concentration Pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89, § 5, O.J. L 219/5, at 15
2,840, at 2097-16 [hereinafter Notification Form].
(1990), Common Mkt. Rep.
Moreover, section 5 of the form does not request any information concerning supplyside substitution.
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purpose of determining the relevant product market and calculating market share, because it represents only a form of potential competition. Like the ease or difficulty of market entry,
this competition is more logically analyzed for its effects on
limiting the market power of a dominant company. According
to this argument, the logical consequence of a focus on supplyside substitution is that foreign imports should also be taken
into account. Worldwide sales and capacities therefore would
have to be included when calculating market share. 93
The Commission has relied on cross-elasticity of supply in
only two cases: Hilti and Tetra Pak.' In Tetra Pak, the Commission took the view that analysis of cross-elasticity of both
demand and supply was ideally suited to the definition of the
relevant market. The Commission stated that
[t]he test of price elasticity synthesizes the many factors that
determine the extent of a relevant market (e.g., physically or
technically substitutable products, consumer preferences,
ease of new firms or products to enter market, etc.). If a
producer or a group of producers dominate(s) a relevant
market so defined, they may be said toenjoy[sic] economic
power unfettered by the threat of real or effective competition. The Court has always stressed that it is the degree to
which economic freedom may be enjoyed that determines
dominance. The test of price elasticity, is in the circumstances of this case therefore, a pertinent one for the rules
of competition since it is closely and logically linked to de93. See F. FISHWICK, supra note 30, at 36. Since the Merger Control Regulation
requires the definition of the relevant market in terms of the common market and
provides for consideration of both potential and foreign competition in the assessment of dominance in article 2(l)(a), the problem of inclusion of foreign competition
in the definition of the relevant market should not in theory arise.
The Bundeskartellamt and the German Monopolies Commission tend to take a
restrictive view of supply-side substitution. The latter has stated that the relevant
market should be defined in terms of current sales of those products regarded by
consumers as short-term substitutes, thereby excluding, except in unusual cases, supply-side substitution. Under this approach, after defining the relevant market, consideration is given to the areas "adjacent to the market" ("Marktnahebereich") which
includes such factors as excess capacity of competitors, supply-side substitutability,
sales of products which consumers might substitute in the longer run and sales of
products which it is advantageous to supply with the relevant product. See supra note
31, at 37.
94. Eurofix-Bauco v. Hilti, 0.J. L 65/19 (1988); Tetra Pak I (BTG license), 0.J.
L 272/27 (1988).
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termining whether dominance exists.9 5
The strength of this argument lies in its assertion that the
test of price elasticity takes into account the factors that determine the extent of a relevant market. The test considers these
factors because they define the ability of the "dominant" company to remain insensitive to price-based competition, which
has been identified by the Court as an indispensable indicium
of dominance. 96 However, the passage also illustrates a tendency to treat the definition of the relevant product market
and the determination as to whether dominance exists in a single determination, rather than in two sequential analytic steps.
As a logical matter, it appears that before dominance can
be assessed, the market in which the allegedly dominant company operates must be defined. Similarly, both demand and
supply-side substitution would appear to be relevant to the
definition of the product market. In theory, consideration of
supply-side substitution need not lead to results different from
those that would be reached by considering supply-side substitution solely to determine whether market power is limited by
the threat of potential competition. However, in practice there
may be a difference in the two approaches. If cross-elasticities
of supply are taken into account in defining the relevant market, greater weight may be given to market share in the assessment of dominance. This may occur even though market share
will normally be lower as a result of the inclusion of supplyside substitution. If cross-elasticities of supply are examined
only for the purpose of determining whether there are checks
on the market power of a company with large market shares,
there may be a greater risk that the concentration will be prohibited, since focus on the large market share may outweigh
the possibility of supply-side substitution.
Another important difference is that consideration of
cross-elasticities of supply places greater emphasis on efficiencies and organization at the level of production. Arguably, this
approach may provide a longer term perspective on markets
and their development. In contrast, demand-side analysis may
place a greater emphasis on the interests of consumers. How95. Tetra Pak, O.J. L 272/27 (1988),
30 (footnote omitted).
96. See Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v. Commission, Case 85/76, 1979 E.C.R. 461,
535, 71, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8527, at 7542-43.
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ever, demand-side analysis may also produce a short-term
analysis that ignores productive efficiencies. The appropriateness of each test may not, of course, vary from case to case, or
industry to industry.
b. The Relevant Geographic Market
The Commission appears to adopt a different approach to
the definition of the relevant geographic market under Article
86 than under Article 85. In the context of Article 85 and, in
particular, its Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance,97
the Commission has stressed the existence of objective barriers to entry-such as transport costs, tariffs, and differing technical standards that cannot be overcome with reasonable effort
and expense-as the key to defining the relevant geographic
market.
In Article 86 cases, at least those involving consumer
products, the Commission has tended to place greater emphasis on subjective criteria that are likely to result in the definition of narrower geographic markets. This approach is also reflected in article 9(7) of the Merger Control Regulation.98
That article refers to consumer preferences, the existence of
homogenous conditions of competition that differ from those
in neighbouring areas, appreciable differences in the undertakings' market shares, and substantial price differences as compared to neighbouring areas. 99
97. Commission Notice of Sept. 3, 1986 concerning agreements of minor importance which do not fall under Art. 85(1) of the Treaty Establishing the EEC, 0.J.
C 231/2 (1986), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2700.
98. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 9(7), O.J. L 257/13, at 20,

Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)

2839, at 2095-12.

99. Id. The same approach is reflected in the notification form in which the relevant geographic market is defined as comprising
the area in which the undertakings concerned are involved in the supply of

products or services, in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently
homogeneous and which can be distinguished from neighbouring areas be-

cause, in particular, conditions of competition are appreciably different in
those areas.
Factors relevant to the assessment of the relevant geographic market
include the nature and characteristics of the products or services concerned,

the existence of entry barriers or consumer preferences, appreciable differences of the undertakings' market shares between neighbouring areas of
substantial price differences.
Notification Form, supra note 92, § 5, 0.J. L 219/5, at 15, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
2840, at 2097-16.
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The relevance of article 9(7) to defining the geographic

market at the Community level is, however, questionable,
although its criteria derive from those applied by the Commis-

sion and the Court in previous cases. They place an emphasis,
however, on local peculiarities that seems to go far beyond the
Court's approach in United Brands Co. v. Commission,'0 0 in which
the Court relied primarily on the existence of different governmental regulatory schemes to exclude certain Member States
from the relevant market. They also appear to be inconsistent
with the Court's approach to the definition of the relevant geo02
0
graphic market in recent cases, such as Bodson 1 t and Alsatel,1
as well
as the Commission's analysis in Tetra Pak 103 and
04
Hilti.1

The criteria referred to in article 9(7) tend to emphasize
local conditions, whose importance may be decreasing in an
increasingly integrated common market. Indeed, the criteria

appear to have been included for the specific purpose of defining narrow, local markets. In so doing, they reflect an approach to geographic market definition that has been pro-

posed as the appropriate one in a study prepared for the Com100. Case 27/76, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 273-76, Common Mark. Rep. (CCH) 8429,
at 7729-7732.
101. Bodson v. S.A. Pompes Fun~bres des Regions Libres, Case 30/87, 1988
E.C.R. 2479, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1990] 1 CEC 3.
102. Alsatel v. Novasam SA, Case 247/86, 1988 E.C.R. 5987, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) [ 1990] 1 CEC 248. The Court's judgment in Alsatel is of particular interest in this regard. In defining the relevant geographic market the Court ignored both
local market conditions and customer dependence. Rather, the Court took the view
that France was the relevant geographic market because authorizations granted to
companies that rented out, installed, maintained, and serviced telephone equipment
were valid throughout France. The fact that Alsatel did the vast majority of its business in Alsace-Lorraine was not, in the Court's view, dispositive. Similarly, the Court
rejected the Commission's argument that, given the importance of the provision of
maintenance services, competition between installers was essentially local or regional
in nature. Id. at 6010, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1990] 2 CEC at 264.
103. OJ. L 272/27 (1988),
29. The Community was defined as the relevant
geographic market despite the fact that preferences as between UHT and fresh milk
and for different kinds of packaging existed in different Member States. Similarly in
United Brands Co. v. Commission, Case 27/76, 1978 E.C.R. 207, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8429, Germany and Ireland were included in the relevant geographic
market although consumption habits differed widely in those two Member States. Id.
at 274, 42. The Commission reached this result because it focused on supply-side
considerations which, arguably, are the key economic indicators, at least in a market
in which production is dependent on technology and the abuse in question related to
an exclusive technology license. Id. at 275-76.
104. OJ. L 65/19 (1988),
56.
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mission.' 0 5 According to this study, transport costs are of less
significance in the Community than legal, institutional and cultural barriers. Thus, under the suggested approach, the existence of either transferability of demand between areas, transferability of supply combined with perfect competition in supply, or transferability of supply combined with identical
demand-price relationships in each area, would be sufficient
0 6
indication of the existence of a single geographic market.1
However, as with article 9(7), the initial factors proposed for
evaluating the existence of one or more of the foregoing conditions would be:
current sales, thus excluding cross-elasticity of supply;
homogeneity of market shares;
price differences; and
correlation of price changes in different areas, subject to
07
adjustment as concerns currency exchange fluctuations.'
The emphasis on transferability of demand would result in

considerable importance being attached to brand loyalties, absence of adequate information, and linguistic or cultural factors. Moreover, this emphasis would be prone to lead to the
definition of narrow geographic markets in the case of consumer goods, as opposed to unbranded intermediate products.
The tendency to define geographic markets narrowly, at
least in the case of branded consumer goods, is best exemplified by the Philip Morris 10' and Douwe Egberts' 0 9 cases. In both
105. F. FISHWICK, supra note 30.

106. Id. at 55. Fishwick is of the view that "even complete absence of barriers to
supply would be insufficient to ensure market integration unless either the supplying
industry had a very competitive structure or demand conditions in each country were
identical." Id. at 57.
107. Id. at 84-86.
108. British American Tobacco Co. v. Commission, Joined Cases 142 & 156/84,
1987 E.C.R. 4487, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,405 (known as Philip Morris). In
Philip Morris, the Commission defined the relevant geographic market as BelgiumLuxembourg (where Rothmans had a 47.8% market share) and the Netherlands
(where it had a forty-nine percent market share), which both constituted substantial
parts of the common market. Id.; see COMM'N, FOURTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 99 (1985); see also Philip Morris, Joined Cases 142 & 156/84, 1987 E.C.R.
4487, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,405 (report for hearing).
In reaching these conclusions, the Commission appears to have relied on the
existence of different brands and the fact that Rothman's market shares were disproportionately large in Belgium-Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Other factors that
may have been relevant are the need to print health warnings in the local language
and a system of excise stamps under which the tax stamps are placed under the pack-
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cases, the Commission focused on brand loyalty and the presence of certain brands in only some Member States, while ignoring pricing levels, sources of supply, transport costs, and
location of production facilities. The very different result in
the Siemens/Nixdorf case, 110 however, suggests that the Commission's proposed narrow approach to geographic market
definition may be limited to consumer goods cases. This tendency toward narrow definition of the relevant geographic
market raises a number of issues of both a technical and policy
nature. Three technical issues may be identified.
First, the emphasis on homogeneity of market share, similarity of pricing, and brand loyalty is historically oriented. It
thus overlooks the possibility of market entry. In addition, it
tends to emphasize subjective factors such as consumer preferences and tastes, which are susceptible to modification and do
not necessarily constitute a lasting structural or legal barrier to
entry unless advertising and other costs are so significant as to
deter entry.
Second, the emphasis on final price levels is inconsistent
with the Court's approach in United Brands and could actually
eliminate geographic price discrimination as an abuse. Furthermore, it may not attach sufficient weight to patterns of supply, the role played by importers and wholesalers, and the possibility that concentrations that result in economies of scale
may have the effect of ultimately harmonizing price levels.
Third, the existence of a "separate" geographic market
age's cellophane wrapper, thus making parallel imports difficult. It is noteworthy
that the importance attached to both common pricing levels and consumer tastes and
loyalties is significantly at odds with the Court's approach in United Brands, in which
there were significant pricing disparities and different consumption habits, even in
the Member States deemed by the Court to comprise the relevant geographic market.
United Brands Co. v. Commission, Case 27/76, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 273-76,
36-57,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8429, at 7729-7732.
109. See European Report, July 27, 1990, No. 1607, at 12. According to the
press reports, DG-IV had concluded that the proposed acquisition by Douwe Egberts
of its principal competitor in the Dutch and Belgian coffee markets, Van Nelle, would

abusively strengthen Douwe Egberts' market position in Belgium. The Commission's
proposed decision has reportedly been blocked at the Cabinet level by opposition
from Commissioner Andriessen.
110. Comm'n Press Release, IP (90) 378 (May 11, 1990). In Siemens/Nixdorf, the
Commission permitted the acquisition to go ahead on the theory that although there
would be large market shares in certain product sectors within Germany there was

sufficient competitive pressure to avoid any long term adverse effects. Id.
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may not be relevant to the assessment of market power. The
"separate" market may be contestable, but outside suppliers
may not yet have entered because there is no advantage to doing so. For example, price levels in the separate market may
not be high enough to attract market entry. If this assumption
is correct, customer or brand loyalty does not mean the absence of cross-elasticity of supply or demand. Rather, it may
only be a sign that prices in the "dominant" market are more
or less in line with those elsewhere. Only a demonstration that
a significant and lasting change in price would not have the
effect of encouraging consumers to switch brands, or encouraging suppliers to enter the market, would provide convincing
evidence that the area in question constitutes a distinct geographic market.
The policy concerns that arise as a result of the gap between the reality and the goal of creating a unified common
market, and that may result in the Commission being confronted with some of its most difficult policy choices under the
Merger Control Regulation, may be summarized as follows.
First, assuming that transactions that affect only a single
Member State would have a "Community dimension" within
the meaning of the Merger Control Regulation, a definition of
narrow geographic markets may lead certain Member States to
question whether a Community regulation is required to control national concentrations that might just as easily be left to
the national authorities. This factor could significantly affect
the Council's reaction to the Commission's eventual proposals
to lower the Merger Control Regulation's thresholds.
Second, if the Commission focuses only on the national
effects of concentrations by defining geographic markets narrowly, it may block concentrations that are necessary to enable
companies from the same Member State or region to achieve
sufficient efficiencies of scale or economic strength to expand
their activities to other Member States. Such an approach
could defeat the market integration rationale that arguably underlies the EEC Treaty.
It has been said that the exclusion of merger control from
the EEC Treaty was based on the view that concentration
would be an important means of accomplishing the integration
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of the internal Community market. "' As the Commission's
1992 program began to experience success, the argument offered in favor of merger control at the Community level was
that such control was necessary and appropriate for efficient
control of multi-jurisdictional transactions, and would ensure
that decisions were made on the basis of a broad, Communitywide perspective. It was assumed that a Community perspective would be more favorable to the concentration than a narrow national one. Recent developments suggest that the Commission is not prepared to accept local concentrations of market power that have significant anticompetitive effects.
This response can hardly be regarded as surprising. However, given the tension between the existing situation and the
aspiration to create a common market, it suggests that the issue of geographic market definition will be one of the most
difficult policy issues to be faced by the Commission and the
Court in applying the Merger Control Regulation. Definition
of the relevant geographic market will not involve a mere technical exercise. Rather, it will be one of the arenas in which
fundamental decisions are made about the nature of Community markets and the manner in which they should develop.
c. Vertical Dependence
Vertical dependence has played a key role in a number of
important Article 86 cases" 2 in which the definition of the relevant market and the calculation of market shares was irrelevant. These cases are potentially relevant to concentration
control centers on two issues. The first is whether the Commission should assess concentrations on the basis of their effects on a single or small class of dependent customers. The
111. See Banks, EEC Mergers and Parting Mergers Under EEC Law, 11 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 255, 288 (1988); see also Venit, Mergers, Acquisitions, andJoint Ventures Under
EEC Law After Philip Morris, ch. 4, Proceedings of the Southwestern Legal Foundation, Private Investors Abroad-Problems and Solutions in International Business
(1989).
112. See Hugin Kassaregister AB v. Commission, Case 22/78, 1979 E.C.R. 1869,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8524; General Motors Continental NV v. Commission,
Case 26/75, 1975 E.C.R. 1367, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8320; British Leyland v.
Commission, Case 226/84, 1986 E.C.R. 3263, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,336;
Centre Beige d'Etudes de March6-Telemarketing SA v. CLT and IPB, Case 311/84,
1985 E.C.R. 3261, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,246; see also Tabacalerra, Comm'n
Press Release, IP (89) 330 (May 8, 1989).
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second is whether greater attention should be paid to the vertical effects of concentrations, or whether concentrations should
be analyzed primarily in light of their horizontal effects.
d. Single Customer Dependence
Except in certain unusual situations where the customer in
question is also a competitor, and the number of competitors
is limited, it would arguably not be appropriate to allow the
dependence of a single customer or a small number of customers to determine the outcome of a merger case. The possibility
of exceptions to this rule is, however, suggested by a recent
case in which the Commission intervened to ensure that a competitor would retain access to a vital input for its business."'
In this case, Stenna UK Limited ("Stenna") had acquired
Houlder Offshore Limited and, in the process, gained control
over two diving support vessels that had previously been used
by Comex, a competitor of Stenna. Following the Commission's intervention, Stenna agreed to hire out one of the vessels to Comex for two years. In the Commission's view, it thus
guarantees Comex the necessary access to an essential input
for its subsea diving services.
e. Vertical Integration and Horizontal Effects
In Hugin/Liptons,"I4 Hugin ranked fourth in the U.K. market. It had only a thirteen percent U.K. market share for cash
registers, behind National Cash Register Corporation
("NCR") with about forty percent, Sweda with eighteen percent, and Gross with sixteen percent." 5 The decision by
Hugin to integrate vertically the distribution of its cash registers may have been a necessary response, required to enable it
to compete with a far stronger and perhaps dominant competitor, NCR. The Commission's determination that Hugin had
abused its dominant position by refusing to supply spare parts
to Liptons has been criticized on the grounds that it focused
on the narrow vertical relationship between Hugin and
Liptons, overlooking (i) the broader implications of Hugin's
decision to integrate vertically on the market for the supply of
113. See Stena/Houlder, Comm'n Press Release, Oct. 23, 1989, IP (89) 795.
114. OJ. L 22/23 (1978).
115. See F. FISHWICK, supra note 30, at 115.
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cash registers; (ii) the fact that, although Liptons might be
eliminated from the market for repair of Hugin's cash registers, Liptons would not be eliminated from the repair business
altogether; and (iii) the absence of any significant negative effect on consumers."i 6 In other words, the Commission's decision protected a competitor in the downstream market for service and repairs; rather than protecting competition in the
horizontal market for the supply of cash registers, in a case in
which the supplier lacked market power and faced considerable competition from more powerful suppliers." 7
In cases of vertical integration by merger or acquisition,
paramount importance perhaps should be attached to the effects on competition on the horizontal level, and to the ultimate interests of consumers. Similarly, it may be appropriate
to place less weight on the consequences for other companies
in the vertical chain, which may be part of the normal competitive process.
f. Actual or Potential Competition Outside the Community
and Meeting International Competition
The Commission must consider actual or potential competition from outside the Community in assessing a concentration, inasmuch as potential market entry is relevant to assessing dominance." 8 Additionally, it appears from the Commission's declarations that the existence of competition from
outside the Community may be relevant for determining the
scope of the geographic market." 9 It is unclear, however,
whether the reference in article 2(l)(a) to "competition from
undertakings located" outside the Community12 0 is also intended to permit the Commission to consider the need of
Community undertakings to increase their competitiveness in
order to meet international competition on markets within or
116. See Fox, supra note 82, at 402-03.
117. Id. at 403. The Commission's approach in Hugin/Liptons has been endorsed by Fishwick, not on the grounds that Liptons was dependent on Hugin, but
rather because, given the low ratio of after-sales service to the price of a new cash
register, Hugin would have been in a position to exploit its dominant position in the
supply of its spare parts with little or no effect on the consumer's choice of new cash
registers. F. FiSHWICK, supra note 30, at 120.
118. See F. FISHWICK, supra note 30, at 121.

119. Declarations, supra note 7, at 265.
120. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, OJ. L 257/13, at 16.
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outside the Community when evaluating the effects of a concentration in the Community.' 2 ' Article 2(l)(a) requires the

Commission to focus only on the effects of the concentration
in the Community. Consideration of the ability of Community
undertakings to compete on world markets may not be relevant unless it can be shown that, absent the concentration in
question, Community undertakings will face the risk of being
dominated by a foreign rival within the Community. 22 On the
other hand actual or potential competition in the Community
from foreign firms may well be relevant to the determination
of whether the concentration is compatible or incompatible
with the common market. As competition becomes increasingly globalized, the need to meet global competition may become important and it is likely to be one of the key policy issues confronted by the Commission in applying the Merger
Control Regulation.
CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT
The substantive test provided for under the Merger Control Regulation has been criticized as being ambiguous and
vague. 12 3 While it is certainly true that a considerable amount
of the Commission's effort went into resolving jurisdictional
and fundamental policy issues, and while article 2 is less specific than either the U.K. Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1977
or article 22 of the GWB, it is not noticeably less specific than
section 7 of the Clayton Act.'

24

Rather, any greater clarity of U.S. law derives not from the
formulation of the statutes but rather from the existence of the
guidelines which have been issued from time-to-time, setting
forth the basic enforcement parameters that would otherwise
be shrouded in interpretive ambiguity. It took considerable
time, however, before interpretive guidelines were issued in
the United States. It is therefore probably unfair to expect the
Commission to issue such guidelines in the absence of concrete experience in applying the Merger Control Regulation.
Rather, it is to be expected that Commission policy and the
121.
122.
123.
124.

Declarations, supra note 7, 2(d), at 266.
Id.
See Hawk, supra note 9, at 213.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
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meaning of the Regulation will only become clear as a result of
individual cases. At some point, it will be necessary to reconcile the contradictions and to provide guidance as to the Commission's policy objectives. Until then the answer to many of
the questions raised by the Regulation will unfold slowly, and
no doubt somewhat unsystematically, in the context of specific
cases.

